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Abstract 
The current studies integrate different frameworks on the positive and negative 
consequences of ethnic diversity for intergroup relations. Using a nationally stratified sample 
of Dutch majority members (N = 680) from 50 cities in the Netherlands, Study 1 
demonstrated that objective diversity was indirectly related to prejudice and to generalized, 
ingroup, and outgroup trust, through more positive and more negative contact. These indirect 
effects tended to be stronger for high versus low authoritarians. Furthermore, perceived 
diversity was indirectly related to less trust and greater prejudice, via more negative contact 
and threat. Again, these associations were more pronounced among high authoritarians. Study 
2, using a representative sample of German majority members (N = 412) nested within 237 
districts, replicated the cross-sectional results regarding objective diversity and prejudice. 
Additionally, longitudinal analyses indicated that objective diversity predicted more positive 
and more negative contact two years later, though only among moderate and high 
authoritarians. 
 
 Key words: ethnic diversity; authoritarianism; intergroup contact, threat, intergroup relations  
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The Diversity Challenge for High and Low Authoritarians: 
Multilevel and Longitudinal Effects through Intergroup Contact and Threat 
The rise in ethnic diversity in Western European societies repeatedly covers the news 
headlines and has attracted increased scholarly attention in social and political sciences 
(Hewstone, 2015). As a result, a growing body of research has investigated the effects of 
diversity on societal and intergroup outcomes such as social capital (e.g., Laurence, 2011; 
Letki, 2008), trust (e.g., Putnam, 2007; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; van der Meer 
& Tolsma, 2014), and prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 2010; Quillian, 1995; Van 
Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014, 2016). The vast majority of these studies have 
shown no overall effects of diversity, yet, this seems to be the result of various processes with 
opposite consequences competing with each other. In the current set of two studies, we aim to 
delineate these processes and their repercussions for several key aspects of intergroup 
relations (e.g., trust and prejudice), taking into account the mediating role of positive 
intergroup contact, negative intergroup contact, and threat, while also considering the 
moderating role of right-wing authoritarianism (see Figure 1). 
Contact and Threat as Mediators of Diversity Effects 
Two conflicting sets of theories have dominated research on ethnic diversity effects 
(see Hewstone, 2015; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014, for reviews). On the one hand, research 
inspired by the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; 
Pettigrew, 1998) has proposed that the growing representation of varied ethnic groups in 
Western societies is associated with more contact between members of different ethnic 
groups, which in turn leads to more tolerance and positivity towards outgroups (e.g., Wagner, 
Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006; Wagner, Van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 2003). 
In line with this perspective, some studies have shown that higher diversity was associated 
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with more positive outgroup perceptions (Oliver & Wong, 2003), and less prejudice 
(Kunovich & Hodson, 2002).  
On the other hand, intergroup conflict theories (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 
1999), encompassing group threat theory (Quillian, 1995) and integrated threat theory 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000), claim that diversity is often perceived as threatening by members 
of the host society (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman, Yom-Tov, & Schmidt, 2004; Taylor, 1998). 
Consequently, diversity would lead to more prejudice and less trust towards ethnic outgroups 
(e.g., Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Schneider, 2008). Based on a sample of over 
30,000 people from 41 American communities, Putnam even concluded that - other things 
being equal - more diversity was associated with less trust both between and within ethnic 
groups (Putnam, 2007). Extending this perspective, Koopmans and Veit (2014) found that 
experimental primes of ethnic diversity caused lower trust in one’s neighbors. 
Putnam’s (2007) infamous ‘constrict claim’, stating that ethnic diversity has 
detrimental consequences for social cohesion and trust, has been the subject of a hot and 
unresolved debate among both policy makers and academics. Following Putnam’s claim, a 
number of studies in several countries tested the ‘hunkering down’ hypothesis. Do individuals 
“pull in like a turtle” (Putnam 2007, p. 149), withdraw from others and from social life at 
large in the face of diversity? In a comprehensive review of 90 post-Putnam studies, van der 
Meer and Tolsma (2014) concluded that, at best, evidence for Putnam’s constrict claim is 
mixed. Especially in European societies, the idea of univocal negative repercussions of 
diversity for trust and prejudice can be refuted (see Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 
2009; Gijsberts, van der Meer, & Dagevos, 2012). In particular, it seems that the two major 
competing processes, positive intergroup contact and perceived outgroup threat, cancel each 
other out, yielding no main effects of diversity.  
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Indeed, various scholars have tried to integrate both theoretical frameworks in one 
single design, and provided evidence for these opposite mechanisms (e.g., Green, Fasel, & 
Sarrasin, 2010; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; 
Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; Schmid et al., 2014). For instance, Schmid and colleagues (2014) 
tested the diversity-trust association in the United Kingdom and demonstrated that diversity as 
such had no substantial overall effects on outgroup trust and outgroup attitudes, because the 
positive effect of higher positive intergroup contact and the negative effect of higher 
perceived threat counterbalanced each other. These opposing processes may thus explain why 
many studies reported non-significant overall effects of diversity on societal and intergroup 
outcomes (Hewstone, 2015; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). 
Authoritarianism as Moderator of Diversity Effects  
Although diversity may instill opposite and “counterbalancing” processes related to 
contact and threat, its effects also seem to depend on the characteristics of the individual. Not 
everyone seems equally sensitive to diversity (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). 
Correspondingly, Wagner and colleagues (2006) suggested that whether contact or threat 
effects dominate, may depend on moderating factors. More specifically, the extent to which 
people hold right-wing social-ideological attitudes has been identified to play a critical role in 
whether ethnic diversity is perceived predominantly as a contact opportunity or as a threat, 
and in turn, is associated with either increased or decreased outgroup positivity (see Kauff, 
Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 2016).  
The seminal work by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) on 
‘The Authoritarian Personality’ offers an interesting outlook on how such individual 
differences have the potential to shape diversity effects. Contemporary accounts conceptualize 
authoritarianism as a social-ideological attitude most frequently operationalized in terms of 
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right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 1981). RWA is defined as the conglomerate of 
conventionalism (i.e., adherence to traditional norms and values), submission to authorities, 
and aggression towards norm violators (Altemeyer 1988). According to Duckitt (2001; see 
also Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2007), people high in right-wing authoritarianism generally 
perceive the world as a dangerous place and are motivated to protect ingroup cohesion, order, 
and collective security. Therefore, right-wing authoritarians tend to perceive ethnic diversity 
more as a threat to traditional norms and values (see also Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; De 
keersmaecker, Van Assche, & Roets, 2016; Kauff et al., 2013; Van Assche, Asbrock, Roets, 
& Kauff, in press). 
Van Assche and colleagues (2014, 2016) showed that authoritarianism shapes the 
associations between diversity and various intergroup outcomes. Specifically, diversity was 
found to be associated with less positive attitudes and more mistrust towards ethnic 
outgroups, yet only among high authoritarians. Among low authoritarians, diversity was 
related to more outgroup positivity. Analogous interaction patterns have been revealed for 
individual differences in left-right self-placement (Karreth, Singh, & Stojek, 2015), dangerous 
worldviews (Sibley et al., 2013) and conformity values (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013), three 
concepts closely related to RWA (Duckitt, 2001). In particular, individuals living in diverse 
environments who strongly endorse conservative ideologies, dangerous worldviews, or group 
conformity typically hold more negative attitudes towards minorities than their neighbors who 
do not hold these respective values. Van Assche and colleagues (2016) further revealed that 
diversity is associated with more outgroup threat, but again, only among high authoritarians. 
Similarly, Kauff and colleagues (2013) found that high (vs. low) authoritarians perceive a 
multicultural ideology as a threat to cultural traditions, which leads to an increase in 
prejudice. In sum, diversity is most likely to be perceived as a threat by authoritarians, and for 
them, diversity consequentially breeds more prejudice and less trust towards minorities. This 
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moderating role of RWA in the relationship between diversity and threat is included as Path A 
in Figure 1. 
The role of authoritarianism in the association between diversity and intergroup 
contact is less straightforward. On the one hand, authoritarians usually tend to avoid contact 
with outgroup members (see Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; 2011; Pettigrew, 2008). However, 
recent research has shown that, in very diverse environments, people high in authoritarianism 
appear to show a steep increase in intergroup contact encounters (Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 
2016). Indeed, although almost all individuals living in diverse areas tend to have increased 
intergroup contact (e.g. Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; see Hewstone, 2015), this effect, 
counterintuitively, was found to be most pronounced among authoritarians (Brune et al., 
2016). This finding suggests that authoritarians in homogenous areas manage to avoid contact 
with other ethnic groups, but in diverse environments - where contact is inevitable - they may 
have no choice but to give up their general avoidance tendencies, and engage more with 
outgroup members. Furthermore, in diverse neighborhoods, where intergroup contact is the 
norm, authoritarians as such comply with the norm (Brune et al., 2016). Yet, this increased 
engagement may include both positive and negative contact experiences. Indeed, while 
previous studies almost exclusively focused on increased opportunities for positive contact, 
diversity likely increases both positive and negative intergroup encounters (Koopmans & 
Veit, 2014). In this regard, Laurence, Schmid, and Hewstone (2017) recently found that 
diversity increased both positive and negative contact, with the former improving and the 
latter harming intergroup relations. It is therefore essential to simultaneously include positive 
and negative intergroup contact when testing diversity effects for high and low authoritarians. 
In sum, we propose that diversity is associated with more (positive and negative) intergroup 
contact, and these associations are especially pronounced for those high in authoritarianism. 
This hypothesis is represented by Paths B and C in Figure 1. 
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Authoritarianism as Moderator of Contact and Threat Effects  
Where positive contact reduces prejudice, threat (and negative contact) induces it. On 
the one hand, a bulk of evidence has accumulated for the positive effects of positive contact 
on many different outcomes (Hewstone & Swart, 2011; Hewstone et al., 2014; Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & Christ, 2011). On the other hand, the negative 
effects of threat on trust and tolerance are also indisputable (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; 
Bobo, 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).  
However, also contact and threat effects on intergroup outcomes have been shown to 
depend on individual differences in authoritarianism (paths D, E and F in Figure 1). For 
example, once authoritarians experience positive intergroup contact, they often benefit from it 
the most (Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009, 2011; Hodson, 
2011; see Figure 1, path D). Moreover, negative contact experiences may also have the 
greatest impact among authoritarians (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; see Figure 1, path E). Hence, 
high authoritarians are most likely to engage in intergroup contact in diverse environments, 
compared to homogeneous environments, and these encounters have the potential to influence 
their prejudice and trust levels to a greater extent. In the same vein, authoritarians tend to be 
most prone to societal threat (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005), 
yielding stronger positive associations of threat with prejudice and negative outgroup 
emotions (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) among those high versus low in authoritarianism. In other 
words, threatening conditions or perceptions - particularly resonant in diverse environments - 
potentially have the greatest impact among those holding strong authoritarian attitudes 
(Stenner, 2005; see Figure 1, path F).  
The Present Studies 
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The current contribution aims to fill the gap in fundamental research on diversity 
effects by integrating previous mediation and moderation approaches into a unifying 
multilevel moderated mediation design (see Figure 1, for a schematic representation of our 
model). Firstly, we want to investigate how diversity affects trust and prejudice 
simultaneously via positive intergroup contact, negative intergroup contact, and outgroup 
threat, and how these processes may counterbalance each other. Secondly, we want to 
examine for whom diversity is most strongly associated with these mediating processes, and 
furthermore, for whom these mediators have the strongest repercussions on relevant 
intergroup outcomes. In Study 1, we focused on five outcomes (i.e., generalized trust, ingroup 
trust, outgroup trust, subtle prejudice, and blatant prejudice), using a unique, nested adult 
sample from the 50 largest cities in the Netherlands. Study 2 dug deeper into racial prejudice 
in a representative German sample, using a rare, yet important longitudinal design.  
Important in the study of diversity effects, is the distinction between objective 
diversity and perceptions of diversity, as they might have differential effects (Hewstone, 
2015; Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2015). In line with this, Semyonov and colleagues (2004) 
found that not the actual relative size of the outgroup population, but rather the perception of 
its size (i.e., the estimated percentage) was associated with greater perceived threat and 
exclusionary outgroup attitudes. Moreover, objective and perceived diversity may in fact also 
work differently through the various processes (Pettigrew et al., 2010). Hence, a thorough test 
of diversity effects should acknowledge this distinction and therefore, in our studies, we look 
at objective diversity as well as the perception of diversity.  
Our first set of hypotheses states that objective diversity yields no overall effects on 
intergroup outcomes, but it may have detrimental total effects for high authoritarians on the 
one hand, and beneficial effects for low authoritarians on the other hand. Moreover, we 
hypothesize that these differences are explained by the indirect associations of diversity with 
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trust and prejudice via positive contact, negative contact, and threat, which should be different 
(and stronger) among high (vs. low) authoritarians.  
Our second set of research questions focuses on perceptions of diversity, which 
potentially yield more detrimental total effects in terms of lower trust and higher prejudice, 
compared to objective diversity. Again, we assume that the indirect associations via positive 
contact, negative contact, and threat are significant, and most pronounced among high 
authoritarians. Finally, we also examine how contact and threat further relate to intergroup 
outcomes, once more hypothesizing that especially the associations would be especially large 
for high authoritarians.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. We used a nationally stratified sample of citizens (N = 680) without 
migration background from the 50 largest cities in the Netherlands (mean number of 
observations per city M = 13.80). This dataset was collected online in 2015 through an 
independent ISO 26362-certified survey company. The mean age of the sample was 51 years 
(SD = 16.69) and 52% were men. Thirty-four percent of the participants had completed 
primary school, 40% had completed high school and 27% had a college or university degree. 
Income distributions are provided in Appendix A. 
Measures. 
Objective diversity. We assessed the percentage of non-Western minority members 
within a specific city as an objective indicator of diversity within the year of data collection 
(see also Van Assche et al., 2016). We used the available data from the Dutch Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS, 2015), indicating the number of individuals per city of non-Western origin, 
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and we calculated the percentage as a function of the total number of registered inhabitants to 
get a measure of relative objective diversity (M = 16.76%, SD = 9.15, MIN = 4.11%, MAX = 
37.34%).  
Estimations of diversity. To measure perceptions of diversity, participants had to 
specify their estimated percentage of non-Western immigrants living in their city, with M = 
28.31% (SD = 17.85, MIN = 0.00%, MAX = 95.00%). 
Right-wing authoritarianism. A 6-item RWA-scale (based on Altemeyer, 1981; see 
Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014) was administered on seven-point scales anchored by one 
(totally disagree) and seven (totally agree). A sample item is ‘Obedience and respect for 
authority are the most important virtues children should learn’, α = .67, M = 4.47 (SD = 1.53). 
Intergroup contact. We assessed intergroup contact by asking respondents the 
frequency of both positive and negative interactions with people of immigrant origin (e.g., 
Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009), using seven-point scales ranging from one (never) to seven (very 
frequently). The items are ‘How often did you have positive interactions with people of 
immigrant origin?’ (M = 4.29, SD = 1.53) and ‘How often did you have negative interactions 
with people of immigrant origin?’ (M = 2.98, SD = 1.53).  
Outgroup threat. Outgroup threat was measured with four items (based on Stephan et 
al., 2002; see also Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011). An example item reads ‘People of immigrant 
origin threaten the way of life of people of Dutch origin’. Respondents answered using seven-
point scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven (totally agree), α = .87, M = 4.03 
(SD = 1.44). 
Trust. We tapped into general, ingroup, and outgroup trust. General trust was 
measured by three items from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014). An example item 
reads ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
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too careful in dealing with people?’. Respondents answered using seven-point scales ranging 
from one (‘You can’t be too careful’) to seven (‘Most people can be trusted’), yielding a 
reliable scale with α = .84; M = 4.19 (SD = 1.15). For ingroup trust, respondents answered to 
one item (‘When you specifically think of people of Dutch origin, do you think most of them 
are to be trusted or not to be trusted?’; M = 4.52, SD = 1.07), anchored by 1 (‘Most people 
cannot be trusted’) and 7 (‘Most people can be trusted’). Outgroup trust was also measured 
with one item (‘When you specifically think of people of immigrant origin, do you think most 
of them are to be trusted or not to be trusted? ’; M = 4.02, SD = 1.23), using the same anchors.  
Racial prejudice. An 8-item subtle racism and a 4-item blatant racism scale were 
administered (based on Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; see Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013). Sample 
items are ‘I feel sympathy for people of immigrant origin’ (reverse coded) for subtle racism 
and ‘All things taken together, the White race is superior over other races’ for blatant racism. 
Respondents answered using seven-point scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven 
(totally agree). Cronbach’s alphas were .82, with M = 4.18 (SD = 0.92), and .88, with M = 
2.30 (SD = 1.39), for subtle and blatant racism, respectively. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. We first investigated whether multilevel analyses were 
warranted because our data were nested (i.e., individuals were located within cities). We 
estimated empty (intercept-only) models which provide insight in the variances in our 
mediators and outcomes at the individual and contextual level. We also assessed the intraclass 
correlations (ICCs) which confirmed there was substantial between-level variance, warranting 
the use of multilevel modeling (see Appendix B)
1
. The correlations among all variables are 
presented in Appendix C.  
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Main Analyses. Multilevel path analyses with maximum likelihood estimation were 
conducted using the MPlus package (version 7.1; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Standard errors 
were computed using bootstrapping (N = 50,000 bootstrap samples). All independent 
variables were centered around the overall average of the sample to control for their 
compositional effects at the contextual level (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We modelled a 
random intercept model where the intercept coefficients vary across cities (see Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002; Pituch & Stapleton, 2012). Specifically, we tested the hypothesized model with 
one context-level predictor (i.e., either objective diversity or estimations of diversity at the 
city level), three individual-level mediators (i.e., positive intergroup contact, negative 
intergroup contact, and outgroup threat), and five individual-level outcomes (i.e., generalized 
trust, ingroup trust, outgroup trust, subtle prejudice, and blatant prejudice). Furthermore, 
RWA was included as an individual-level moderator variable and we allowed each path of the 
mediation model to be moderated by RWA. For all paths, we estimated the effects for low ( < 
1 SD below the mean), medium (mean level), and high ( > 1 SD above the mean) 
authoritarians, as such examining the conditional effects of the predictor and mediators at 
various levels of RWA (while allowing all individual-level variables to vary both between 
individuals and between contexts; see Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004, p. 87-
88; for similar procedures in multilevel regression models)
2
. Tables 1a and 1b display the 
standardized coefficients of the model considering objective diversity, and tables 2a and 2b 
portray the standardized coefficients for the model considering perceived diversity
3
. 
As expected, the results showed that higher objective diversity was related to more 
positive and more negative contact, but only among individuals with moderate or high levels 
of authoritarianism (see Table 1a). Positive contact was further associated with more trust and 
less prejudice, and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for negative contact. Most 
importantly, the results indicated that there were no significant total effects of objective 
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diversity on any of the five outcomes (see Table 1b). Nonetheless, there were significant 
indirect effects via positive and negative contact, but only among those with average and high 
levels of authoritarianism. In sum, overall, objective diversity did not affect intergroup 
relations, as it was associated with both more positive and more negative intergroup contact, 
and hence the “positive” and the “negative” process cancelled each other out. Finally, these 
indirect effects were more pronounced among high authoritarians, and less outspoken or even 
absent among low authoritarians. Surprisingly, outgroup threat did not mediate objective 
diversity effects.  
Secondly, the results concerning perceived diversity showed a somewhat different 
pattern. Higher estimates of diversity were related to more negative intergroup contact and 
higher threat perceptions, and these two “negative” processes were further associated with 
less trust and more prejudice (see Table 2a). Most importantly, the results indicated that there 
were significant negative total effects of estimations of diversity on trust, and significant 
positive total effects on prejudice, but only among moderate and high authoritarians (see 
Table 2b). Furthermore, there were significant indirect effects via negative contact and threat, 
but not via positive contact. The conclusion here is that, overall, unlike the results with 
objective diversity, higher individual estimates of diversity seem to drive down trust and 
increase prejudice, as these estimates were associated with both more negative contact and 
more threat, two “negative” processes that add up to less tolerance. Finally, similar to the 
objective diversity results, these relations were generally more outspoken among high 
authoritarians whereas they were smaller and even non-significant among low authoritarians.  
Brief Discussion 
In conclusion, in Study 1, our hypotheses were confirmed with regards to the lack of 
total effects of objective diversity versus the negative total effects for estimations of diversity. 
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Secondly, with regards to the processes explaining the total effects, we found mediation 
effects via positive and negative contact when considering objective diversity effects versus 
mediation effects via negative contact and threat when considering estimations of diversity. 
Thirdly, across both models, our results confirm that it is crucial to take into account 
individual differences in authoritarianism, as the relations are especially pronounced among 
individuals with average or high levels of RWA. 
Finally, our findings revealed largely similar repercussions of diversity for three 
pertinent trust outcomes as well as for two forms of racial prejudice. Indeed, generalized trust, 
commonly regarded as part of the “social glue” that holds communities together (Schmid et 
al., 2014), trust in ethnic outgroups, and subtle and blatant prejudicial attitudes towards these 
outgroups are to largely the same extent affected by diversity, through the same mechanisms, 
and with consistently stronger effects among high authoritarians. Yet, ingroup trust was 
slightly differentially affected for high versus low authoritarians. Specifically, as 
authoritarians are prominently concerned about ingroup protection (Duckitt, 2001), negative 
intergroup contact and threat experiences accompanying diversity did not necessarily lower 
their trust in the own ethnic group. 
Study 2 
Study 2 extended Study 1 in two significant ways. Firstly, Study 2 was conducted in 
Germany, another Western European country with a fair share of immigrants and foreigners. 
Secondly, we examined the longitudinal effects of diversity, which has rarely been done in 
previous research. Study 2 involved secondary analyses of existing data with less variables 
compared to Study 1. Yet, the data set included a sufficient number of critical variables to test 
our hypotheses. More specifically, Study 2 tested the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects 
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of objective and perceived diversity on racial prejudice, through positive and negative contact 
(but not threat) for high and low authoritarians.  
Method 
Participants. We analyzed a representative sample of German majority members (N = 
412 individuals nested within 237 districts
4
, mean number of observations per district M = 
1.74) from the 2008 (T1) and 2010 (T2) waves of the Group-Focused Enmity project 
(Heitmeyer, 2002). There were no missing data among respondents who completed the 
questionnaire at both time points. The mean age of the sample at T1 was 51 years (SD = 
14.55) and 45% were men. Thirty-three percent of the participants had completed primary 
school, 21% had completed lower high school, 29% upper high school, and 17% had a college 
or university degree. Income distributions, family status and religious affiliation are provided 
in Appendix A. 
Measures. 
Objective diversity. We assessed the share of foreigners in each district as an objective 
indicator of diversity within the year of data collection (MT1 = 7.62%, SDT1 = 5.60, MINT1 = 
0.70%, MAX T1 = 23.50%; and MT2 = 7.55%, SDT2 = 5.57, MINT2 = 0.70%, MAX T2 = 
23.40%).  
Perceived diversity. To assess perceptions of diversity, respondents had to evaluate 
‘How many foreigners live in your neighborhood?’ using four-point rating scales ranging 
from one (absolutely none) to four (a great number; MT1 = 2.10, MT2 = 0.89; MT2 = 2.04, SDT2 
= 0.82). 
Right-wing authoritarianism. A 4-item RWA-scale based on Altemeyer (1981) and 
Lederer (1982) was administered on four-point scales anchored by one (I do not agree at all) 
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and four (I totally agree). A sample item is ‘Crime should be punished more harshly’. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .76 at T1 and .78 at T2, with MT1 = 2.70 (SDT1 = 0.69) and MT2 = 2.73 
(SDT2 = 0.71). 
Intergroup contact. We assessed the frequency of both positive and negative contact 
experiences with ethnic minorities (in this study referred to as ‘foreigners’), using four-point 
scales ranging from one (never) to four (frequently). The positive contact items were ‘How 
often did a foreigner help you?’ and ‘How often did you have an interesting conversation with 
a foreigner?’. Both items were strongly positively related (rT1 = .49, p < .001; rT2 = .50, p < 
.001), MT1 = 2.54 (SDT1 = 0.83) and MT2 = 2.50 (SDT2 = 0.82). The item for negative contact 
reads ‘How often were you harassed by a foreigner?’ (MT1 = 1.42, SDT1 = 0.67; and MT2 = 
1.45, SDT2 = 0.68).  
Racial Prejudice. A 4-item racial prejudice scale was administered (based on Wasmer, 
Koch, Harkness, & Gabler, 1996). A sample item reads ‘There are too many foreigners living 
in Germany’. Respondents answered using four-point scales ranging from one (I do not agree 
at all) to seven (I totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .80 at T1 and .81 at T2, with MT1 = 
2.20 (SDT1 = 0.68) and MT2 = 2.21 (SDT2 = 0.67). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. As in Study 1, we investigated whether multilevel analyses 
were warranted because our data were nested (i.e., individuals were located within districts). 
We estimated empty (intercept-only) models which provided insight in the individual- and 
context-level variances in our mediators and outcomes. We also calculated the ICCs which 
confirmed there was substantial between-level variance, warranting the use of multilevel 
modeling (see Appendix B). Correlations among all study variables can be found in Appendix 
C.  
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Main Analyses. A multilevel random intercept model was tested, in which the 
intercept coefficients varied across districts (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Pituch & 
Stapleton, 2012). Specifically, we investigated a model with one predictor (i.e., either 
objective district-level or perceived individual-level diversity), two individual-level mediators 
(i.e., positive and negative intergroup contact), and one individual-level outcome (i.e., racial 
prejudice). In order to compute the slopes for low and high authoritarians, we allowed each 
path to be moderated by individual-level RWA. For all paths, we estimated the effects for low 
( < 1 SD below the mean), medium (mean level), and high ( > 1 SD above the mean) 
authoritarians, as such examining the conditional effects of the predictor and mediators at 
various levels of RWA (allowing all individual-level variables to vary between individuals 
and contexts; cf., Raudenbush et al., 2004). Tables 3a and 3b report all standardized 
coefficients of the cross-sectional and longitudinal models considering objective diversity. 
Tables 4a and 4b portray all standardized coefficients of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
model considering perceived diversity.  
Cross-sectional Results. Firstly, higher objective diversity was related to more 
positive and more negative intergroup contact, especially among individuals with moderate or 
high levels of authoritarianism (see Table 3a). Positive contact was further associated with 
less prejudice, and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for negative contact, but only 
among moderate and high authoritarians. Importantly, the results further indicated that there 
were no significant total effects of objective diversity on prejudice (see Table 3b). 
Nonetheless, there were significant indirect effects via positive and negative contact, which 
were especially pronounced among those with average and high levels of authoritarianism. In 
line with the results of Study 1, objective diversity did not show an overall significant effect 
on prejudice because it was associated with both more positive and more negative intergroup 
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contact, which, in turn had opposite effects on prejudice. These indirect effects were less 
outspoken or even absent among low authoritarians.  
Secondly, the cross-sectional results concerning perceived diversity showed an 
analogous pattern. Higher perceived diversity was related to more positive and more negative 
intergroup contact, especially among individuals with moderate or high levels of 
authoritarianism (see Table 4a). Positive contact was further associated with less prejudice, 
and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for negative contact, but only among moderate 
and high authoritarians. Most importantly, the results indicated that there were no total effects 
of perceived diversity on prejudice, except for a negative total effect for low authoritarians at 
T2 (see Table 4b). Furthermore, perceived diversity simultaneously showed a prejudice-
reducing indirect effect via more positive contact experiences (which was significant for 
everyone) and a prejudice-enhancing indirect effect via more negative contact experiences 
(which was only significant among moderate and high authoritarians).  
Longitudinal Results. The cross-sectional analyses at T1 and T2 provided evidence 
for the hypothesized diversity-prejudice relation via positive and negative contact, which were 
especially outspoken among those high in RWA. Yet, to provide more clear indication of the 
direction of the associations, longitudinal analyses were conducted, following the procedure 
suggested by Cole and Maxwell (2003). In particular, we tested a model in which the centered 
T1 scores of diversity and RWA, as well as their interaction term predicted the T2 scores of 
positive and negative contact, controlling for T1 scores of positive and negative contact. By 
including the T1 contact scores, we controlled for the stability effect of contact over time (i.e., 
including the autoregressive paths; β = .60, p < .001 and β = .53, p < .001 for positive and 
negative contact, respectively). Furthermore, the centered T1 scores of contact and RWA, as 
well as their interaction terms were included as predictors of the T2 scores of prejudice, 
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controlling for T1 scores of diversity and prejudice (with the autoregressive path β = .71, p < 
.001).  
The bottom lines of Tables 3 and 4 display the standardized coefficients of the model 
considering objective and perceived diversity, respectively. As expected, higher levels of 
objective diversity predicted more positive and more negative intergroup contact over time. 
Importantly, this was only the case among those with medium and high levels of RWA, in 
line with our hypotheses (see Table 3a). The paths from perceived diversity showed no such 
pattern (see Tables 4a). Finally, all longitudinal total and indirect effects of diversity on 
prejudice did not reach significance (see Tables 3b and 4b for the models considering 
objective and perceived diversity, respectively).  
Brief Discussion 
In Study 2, we were able to replicate the cross-sectional results considering objective 
diversity and prejudice. Indeed, the opposing processes of positive and negative intergroup 
contact largely drive the null effects of objective diversity. Moreover, higher objective 
diversity longitudinally predicted more positive and more negative intergroup contact, 
especially among those with average and high levels of authoritarianism. Finally, the cross-
sectional results for perceived diversity were similar to the objective diversity results, though 
they were not in line with the results considering estimations of diversity in Study 1. It seems 
that, compared to higher estimates of diversity, higher perceived diversity did not show the 
same negative relations with intergroup attitudes, which suggests an intriguing difference 
between both ‘types of measurement’ of diversity perceptions. 
General Discussion 
The present series of studies investigated the associations of ethnic diversity with 
several aspects of intergroup relations, taking into account important mediators (i.e., positive 
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and negative contact and threat) as well as a critical moderator (i.e., authoritarianism) of these 
associations. The results of the multilevel models in Study 1 and Study 2 indicated that the 
non-significant overall associations of objective diversity with generalized, ingroup, and 
outgroup trust, as well as with subtle and blatant prejudice, were the result of mediating 
processes through positive and negative intergroup contact, working in opposite directions, 
while intergroup threat played no meaningful role. Moreover, a closer inspection of the slopes 
of the indirect effects for individuals high versus low in authoritarianism specified that 
especially among moderately and highly authoritarians, higher proportions of ethnic 
outgroups related to both more positive and more negative intergroup contact. The 
longitudinal results in Study 2 showed that, also over time, moderate and high authoritarians 
engage in more (positive as well as negative) contact when diversity levels are higher in their 
local environment.  
Secondly, the results concerning perceptions of diversity yielded an interesting insight 
into the dynamics of diversity ‘in the eye of the beholder’. In Study 1, higher estimates of 
minority proportions (measured via percentage-guesses) were related to lower levels of trust 
and higher levels of prejudice via more negative intergroup contact and more outgroup threat, 
but not via positive intergroup contact. Again, these indirect associations were especially 
present among high authoritarians. Remarkably, in Study 2, higher perceived ethnic diversity 
(asking for respondents’ general impressions of diversity on scales ranging from “no 
diversity” to “a great degree of diversity”) showed no associations with prejudice. In fact, 
overall, higher perceived diversity was unrelated to prejudice. Moreover, analogous to the 
results regarding objective diversity, the non-significant total associations of perceived 
diversity with prejudice were mediated by both positive and negative intergroup contact. Once 
more, the slopes for these indirect effects tended to be more pronounced among moderate and 
high authoritarians. Longitudinally, however, higher perceptions of diversity were not related 
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to higher levels of contact or prejudice over time. In the following, we discuss each of these 
core findings. 
The Repercussions of Ethnic Diversity for Intergroup Relations 
Objective versus subjective diversity. First and foremost, the results indicate that 
objective, estimated, and perceived indicators of diversity demonstrate differential 
relationships when it comes to intergroup relations. Indeed, whereas higher levels of objective 
diversity and higher perceptions of diversity did not show an overall relationship with 
intergroup attitudes because they simultaneously related to a constructive and a harmful 
process (i.e., both positive and negative intergroup contact), higher estimates of diversity were 
related to more negative intergroup attitudes because they related to two harmful processes 
(i.e., negative intergroup contact and perceptions of outgroup threat) at once. In corroboration 
with previous research, we found that the indirect effects of objective diversity via contact 
appeared to be stronger than via threat (e.g., Savelkoul et al., 2011; Schmid et al., 2014). Yet, 
in line with Laurence and colleagues (2017), we argue that it is warranted to look beyond just 
positive contact, as objective diversity offers opportunities for both positive and negative 
contact with ethnic and cultural outgroups.  
Furthermore, we found that higher estimates of diversity sparked feelings of threat, 
corroborating previous research (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2004). This might indicate that the 
measurement of estimated diversity is more inflated and biased compared to the more 
‘neutral’ formulation of Likert-scale perceived diversity items. We argue that estimates of 
diversity, compared to general evaluations, are indeed far more likely to be misjudged, 
overemphasized, and driven by previous personal attitudes. Specifically, almost all majority 
members tend to overestimate the actual relative size of the minority population (see Hooghe 
& De Vroome, 2015). It seems reasonable that such exaggerated estimates of minority 
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proportions do not form a basis for (self-reported) positive experiences with ethnic outgroups. 
Conversely, our findings showed that higher actual minority proportions do stimulate 
individuals to engage in (positive as well as negative) intergroup contact, and as such offer a 
more complete portrait of the opportunities within diverse settings. 
 The role of individual differences in authoritarianism. Our results also highlight 
the importance of taking individual differences into account when testing diversity effects. 
Our multilevel interaction approach of simultaneously including psychological and socio-
structural variables in the prediction of social phenomena speaks directly to Pettigrew’s 
(1991, 2008) general calls for an integrative ‘contextual social psychology’. Furthermore, by 
considering the interplay between diversity and authoritarianism in various psychological 
processes, our research neatly builds upon the growing scholarly interest in applying this 
person X context interplay to the field of intergroup relations (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). 
Indeed, the question of whether and how diversity affects the social cohesion of communities 
has become an increasingly prominent and contested topic of debate (see Putnam, 2007) and 
individual differences in authoritarianism might serve as a key variable here. Whereas 
previous research has accumulated evidence for the moderating role of authoritarianism in the 
relations between a) diversity and contact (e.g., Brune et al., 2016), b) diversity and threat 
(e.g., Van Assche et al., 2016), and c) diversity and intergroup attitudes (e.g., Kauff et al., 
2013; Van Assche et al., 2014, 2016), the question remained how authoritarianism shaped the 
total, direct and indirect effects of diversity via the three main mediating processes. 
As such, the results of this study extends previous research on diversity, intergroup 
contact and threat (e.g. Hewstone, 2015; Putnam, 2007; Schmid et al., 2014) by demonstrating 
that diversity effects are especially pronounced among moderate and high authoritarians, and 
sometimes even non-significant among low authoritarians. These findings seem to indicate 
that in diverse areas, where contact is highly likely and presumably more normative, 
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authoritarians do not necessarily avoid the outgroup (as is their ‘natural’ inclination). On the 
contrary, in an environment with many ethnic outgroups, authoritarians might perceive 
contact with such groups as inevitable and even normative (see also Brune et al., 2016). 
Remarkably, we replicated the findings of Brune and colleagues (2016) using a different 
diversity indicator (i.e., the proportion of immigrants in Study 1 and foreigners in Study 2 
versus the proportion of Asians in the Brune et al. study) and a different contact indicator (i.e., 
frequency of positive and frequency of negative contact experiences versus an intergroup 
friendship scale in the Brune et al. study). This is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, 
authoritarians likely feel more threatened by the presence of immigrants and foreigners as 
opposed to Asians (who are usually perceived as more competent; see Asbrock, 2010; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Still, we found that, even over time, authoritarians engage in 
contact with these outgroups. Secondly, where Brune and colleagues show that, for high 
authoritarians, diversity relates to intergroup friendship as an affective high-quality form of 
contact, we corroborate and extend these results by showing that diversity relates to less close 
forms of positive contact (i.e., mere quantity of positive experiences) and also to negative 
contact experiences. Future research could directly assess intergroup contact quality, or could 
assess the hours of positive versus the hours of negative contact, testing the possibility that the 
increased amount of intergroup encounters for authoritarians in the face of diversity might 
include relatively more negative experiences than positive ones.  
Intriguingly, while our findings indicate that individuals high in authoritarianism are 
most prominently impacted by diversity, they also suggest that individuals low in 
authoritarianism are little affected by diversity in terms of contact, threat, and intergroup 
attitudes. Future studies could specifically focus on low authoritarians by investigating why 
they are less sensitive to diverse environments compared to high authoritarians (see Van 
Assche, Dhont, Van Hiel, & Roets, in press; Van Assche et al., 2016). A tentative hypothesis 
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could be that low authoritarians also have more intergroup contact and immigrant friends 
outside their local area, and thus depend less on the diversity in their direct physical 
environment for intergroup contact.  
Finally, it is valuable to include several intergroup outcomes when examining 
diversity effects. In our aim to test Putnam’s pessimistic hunkering down hypothesis, we took 
into account five aspects of intergroup attitudes. With regards to the consequences of 
objective and perceived diversity, we found no evidence for any detrimental effects across our 
outcomes. With regards to the correlates of estimations of diversity, however, our results 
suggest that this aspect of diversity is indeed connected to greater prejudice and lower trust, in 
people in general, in ethnic outgroups, and even in one’s own ethnic group. Whereas the 
impact of diversity tends to generalize across various intergroup facets, the conclusions for 
threat and contact effects are slightly divergent for outgroup attitudes (i.e., outgroup trust, 
subtle and blatant prejudice) compared to ingroup attitudes (i.e., ingroup trust) and more 
general attitudes (i.e., generalized trust). Positive contact experiences did ameliorate all these 
attitudes (with their largest benefits among high authoritarians; see also Dhont & Van Hiel, 
2009). Negative contact and threat, on the other hand, decreased outgroup trust and increased 
prejudice for high and low authoritarians alike (with the exception that negative contact did 
not affect low authoritarians’ blatant prejudice), but only in low authoritarians did these 
negative processes also decrease ingroup and generalized trust. Indeed, high authoritarians’ 
perceived outgroup threat was even related to more ingroup trust, suggesting that they apply 
some sort of defense mechanism which protects against decreased ingroup trust in the face of 
negative intergroup experiences (cf. Kessler & Cohrs, 2008). Future research could dig deeper 
into this mechanism and test our speculative hypothesis. 
Strengths, Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
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The present study included slightly different measures and different levels of analysis 
across two studies, which precludes direct comparisons but offers insights in the robustness of 
our findings. Moreover, by including an objective as well as and two subjective measures of 
diversity, we went beyond most previous diversity research. This differentiation is important 
because the similarity in findings for objective and perceived measures indicates that the 
results found with the perceived measure are robust and could not merely be attributed to 
biased or extreme responding. The deviating findings found for estimations of diversity, on 
the other hand, might point to potentially biased responding, a measurement issue which 
future research may want to investigate in greater detail.  
A second merit bears upon the inclusion of both small-to-medium (i.e., city) and 
medium-to-large (i.e., district) levels of analysis to measure the specific ethnic environment of 
the respondents. In Study 1, we even specifically collected nested data with at least 5 
observations per contextual unit. The specific choice for a relatively broad contextual unit of 
analysis may however also constitute a drawback, as previous studies suggested that ethnic 
diversity mainly affects trust in the micro-context, whereas these effects vanish in larger 
contextual units (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Koster, 2013). Indeed, diversity in the local 
neighborhood makes a stronger impression on individuals (Schaeffer, 2014), being the most 
direct geographical environment in which people spend most of their social time (Tolsma, van 
der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009). Yet, the present study, using two medium levels of analysis, 
showed no main effects of objective as well as perceived diversity, as such substantiating 
previous studies using smaller contextual units-of-analysis (e.g., Gijsberts et al., 2012; 
Schmid et al., 2014) as well as replicating studies that also used relatively large levels of 
analysis (e.g., the country-level study of Hjerm, 2007; the region-level study of Evans and 
Need, 2002, and the municipality-level study of Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). 
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Thirdly, future studies could empirically assess the contextual level where diversity 
exerts its strongest impact, and investigate which mediators play a role at which level. For 
example, it would be insightful to simultaneously examine ethnic diversity at the local, 
intermediate, and national level, to see whether contact effects outperform threat effects at 
each level. Indeed, regional diversity might not only relate to more individual contact 
experiences, but also to more “higher-level” contact. Christ and colleagues (2014) already 
showed that living in a contextual setting where fellow ingroup members engage in intergroup 
contact is extremely beneficial in terms of reduced prejudice, even among those who rarely 
experience individual face-to-face contact. This between-level effect of intergroup contact is 
even greater than its individual-level effect, and might also show a differential associations 
with intergroup attitudes for low versus high authoritarians.  
Fourthly, by applying longitudinal analyses, we gained greater insight into how 
diversity impacts intergroup contact and prejudice in the longer run. Our results indicated that, 
over a period of two years, higher minority proportions heighten positive and negative 
intergroup contact experiences, but they did not relate to prejudice levels over time. There 
may be various reasons for this lack of longitudinal effect on prejudice. Firstly, actual 
minority proportions did not change that much in the two-year period we considered. In fact, 
the levels dropped on average 0.07%, ranging from a small decrease of 1.20% in some 
districts to a small increase of 0.30% in others. Secondly, we believe that while contact 
experiences can easily vary both in quantity and quality, prejudiced attitudes may be less 
subjected to momentary circumstances but rather relatively stable across a few months or 
years, leaving not much room for diversity to exert a significant impact (cf., the correlation 
between prejudice at T1 and T2 was .78; see Appendix C, see also Dhont, Van Hiel, De Bolle, 
& Roets, 2012). Future studies may examine the change in the ethnic composition and its 
potential long-term effects on prejudice over a longer period of time with special attention to 
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periods with large and sudden upsurges in immigration of foreign-born people (cf., the recent 
increase of refugees).  
Finally, future research may want to use more elaborate (multi-item) measures, which 
are more reliable and may yield larger effect sizes, especially with regards to intergroup 
contact effects (see Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Although the use of short scales (and 
particularly the lack of a threat measure in Study 2) is a limitation of the current contribution, 
we believe this research sets an example in two other ways. Firstly, in terms of model 
building, we included many critical variables into one coherent and comprehensive model, 
hence avoiding ‘the Single Factor Fallacy’ (i.e., the missing of key variables which might 
distort results and conclusions; Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Secondly, in terms of 
methodology, we acknowledged the complex nature of the effects and processes instigated by 
diversity through applying mediation–moderation multilevel analyses and longitudinal 
research. 
Conclusion 
Our results add a crucial piece of the puzzle that goes beyond previous research 
unraveling the complex and multifaceted diversity effects. By providing new insights into the 
mediating role of contact and threat and the moderating role of authoritarianism in the 
associations of diversity with various facets of intergroup relations, this research will 
hopefully encourage future research to further develop the interesting theoretical framework 
of ethnic diversity, right-wing ideologies and intergroup processes and attitudes.   
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Notes 
 [1]
 As the variances at the contextual level in the mediators and outcomes were rather 
small (all ICCs < 0.05 in Study 1 and < 0.14 in Study 2), we also ran individual-level path 
models in SPSS, using Hayes’ (2013) Process macro Model 59 (N = 50.000 bootstrap 
samples). These analyses yielded virtually identical results and are available upon request 
with the first author. 
[2]
 The specific syntax for all analyses can be found in Appendix D. 
[3]
 Alternative models considering the indirect effects of prejudice in the associations 
of diversity with intergroup contact and threat only provided limited evidence for prejudice as 
a mediator. Additionally, a test of a model investigating the conditional effects of objective 
diversity on subjective diversity revealed that, in both studies, the strong and positive 
associations between objective and subjective diversity were especially pronounced among 
medium and high authoritarians (even over time). As such, we replicated previous findings by 
Van Assche and colleagues (2016) in a longitudinal sample and in another country. The 
results of these analyses can be found in Appendix E.  
[4]
 Germany is divided into 440 districts (“Kreise”), which are subdivisions of a 
government district ("Regierungsbezirk"), which itself is the subdivision of a federal state 
(“Land or Bundesland”). Sizes of districts vary between approximately 35,000 and 3,400,000 
inhabitants. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Schematic Representation of the tested Moderated Mediation Model of Diversity Effects 
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Tables 
Table 1a  
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering 
Objective Diversity’s Effects on the Mediators, and the Mediators’ Effects on Intergroup 
Outcomes at different levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
Paths  
 
 
IV  MEDIATOR    OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA  
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: 0.091
a
 Positive 
Contact 
0.101
a 
0.145*** 0.189*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.127** 0.128* 0.135*** 0.143*** Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.151**  0.138**
 
0.191*** 0.245*** Outgroup Trust 
   -0.211*** -0.189*** -0.167*** Subtle Prejudice 
   -0.236*** -0.255*** -0.273*** Blatant Prejudice 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: 0.081 Negative 
Contact 
-0.282*** -0.251*** -0.220*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.132*** -0.273*** -0.150*** -0.027 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.186***  -0.284*** -0.248*** -0.212*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.197*** 0.226*** 0.254*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.019 0.098** 0.176*** Blatant Prejudice 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: -0.042 Threat -0.145** -0.111* -0.078 Generalized Trust 
M: 0.001  -0.155* -0.035 0.086 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.055  -0.261*** -0.246*** -0.230*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.530*** 0.537*** 0.544*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.489*** 0.494*** 0.499*** Blatant Prejudice 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; L = Low; M = Medium; H = High 
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Table 1b 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering 
Objective Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects on Intergroup Outcomes 
Paths  
 
  
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Threat 
Objective  
Diversity 
Generalized 
Trust  
Low 0.010 0.014 0.006 -0.022 0.008 
Medium  -0.016 -0.007 0.017** -0.034***
 
-0.001 
  High -0.041 -0.028 0.034** -0.044*** -0.003 
Objective  
Diversity 
Ingroup  
Trust  
Low 0.040 0.024 0.003 -0.019 0.007 
Medium  0.010 -0.004 0.015* -0.020**
 
0.000 
  High -0.020 -0.032 0.033* -0.013** -0.005 
Objective  
Diversity 
Outgroup  
Trust  
Low 0.008 0.007 0.010* -0.023 0.013 
Medium  -0.004 0.000 0.023** -0.034***
 
-0.001 
  High -0.019 -0.006 0.041** -0.041*** -0.012 
Objective  
Diversity 
Subtle  
Prejudice  
Low -0.046 -0.022 -0.020** 0.016 -0.023 
Medium  0.018 0.005 -0.024** 0.030*** 0.003 
  High 0.081
a 
0.031 -0.026** 0.047*** 0.030 
Objective  
Diversity 
Blatant 
Prejudice  
Low -0.010 0.032 -0.022** 0.000 -0.024 
Medium  0.017 0.030 -0.032** 0.013*
 
0.003 
  High 0.043 0.028 -0.044** 0.036** 0.025 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table 2a  
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering 
Estimations of Diversity’s Conditional Total Effects on the Mediators, and the Mediators’ 
Conditional Total Effects on Intergroup Outcomes 
Paths       
IV  MEDIATOR    OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.017 Positive 
Contact 
0.112*
 
0.149*** 0.185*** Generalized Trust 
M: -0.004 0.141** 0.140** 0.139** Ingroup Trust 
 H: -0.024  0.145** 0.196*** 0.246*** Outgroup Trust 
   -0.204*** -0.182*** -0.160*** Subtle Prejudice 
   -0.235*** -0.254*** -0.272*** Blatant Prejudice 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.231*** Negative 
Contact 
-0.262*** -0.231*** -0.199*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.257*** -0.255*** -0.127*** 0.000 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.283***  -0.280*** -0.240*** -0.200*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.211*** 0.241*** 0.272*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.013 0.098** 0.182*** Blatant Prejudice 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.190*** Threat -0.126* -0.090
a
 -0.054 Generalized Trust 
M: 0.192***  -0.139** -0.015 0.109
a 
Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.194***  -0.251*** -0.232*** -0.212*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.537*** 0.545*** 0.553*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.479*** 0.486*** 0.494*** Blatant Prejudice 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; L = Low; M = Medium; H = High 
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Table 2b 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering 
Estimations of Diversity’s Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects on Intergroup 
Outcomes 
Paths  
 
  
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Threat 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Generalized 
Trust  
Low -0.160** -0.069 0.001 -0.060** -0.030* 
Medium  -0.183*** -0.103** -0.001 -0.018* -0.018* 
  High -0.206*** -0.137** -0.005 -0.006* -0.006 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Ingroup  
Trust  
Low -0.144** -0.066 0.001 -0.051** -0.028* 
Medium  -0.140** -0.104** 0.000 -0.034** -0.003 
  High -0.136** -0.141** -0.005 -0.012 0.021
a 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Outgroup  
Trust  
Low -0.210***
 
-0.095
a 
0.002
 
-0.063** -0.051*** 
Medium  -0.174*** -0.065
a 
-0.001 -0.063** -0.045*** 
  High -0.159** -0.034 -0.006 -0.061** -0.039** 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Subtle  
Prejudice  
Low 0.088
 
-0.055 -0.004 0.047** 0.102*** 
Medium  0.103** -0.063** 0.001 0.061** 0.104*** 
  High 0.118** -0.071** 0.004
 
0.077*** 0.107*** 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Blatant 
Prejudice  
Low 0.125
a 
0.029 -0.004 0.000 0.101*** 
Medium  0.149** 0.028 0.001 0.025** 0.094*** 
  High 0.174** 0.026 0.007
 
0.056*** 0.088*** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table 3a  
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Objective Diversity’s Conditional Total Effects on the 
Mediators, and the Mediators’ Conditional Total Effects on Prejudice 
Paths    
IV  MEDIATOR    OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Cross-sectional   
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.218*** Positive 
Contact 
T1 
 
   
M: 0.229*** -0.261***
 
-0.274*** -0.286*** Prejudice T1 
H: 0.248*** 
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.193** Negative 
Contact 
T1 
 
   
M: 0.239*** 0.074 0.097* 0.121* Prejudice T1 
H: 0.279*** 
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.206*** Positive 
Contact 
T2 
 
   
M: 0.221*** -0.266*** -0.230*** -0.198*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.237*** 
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.117
a
 Negative 
Contact 
T2 
 
   
M: 0.205*** 0.093 0.130*** 0.179*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.293*** 
 
   
Longitudinal   
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.063 Positive 
Contact 
T2/T1 
 
   
M: 0.083* -0.053 -0.033 -0.012 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.103* 
 
   
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.057 Negative 
Contact 
T2/T1 
 
   
M: 0.089* 0.027 0.013 -0.001 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.121* 
 
   
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; L = Low; M = Medium; H = High 
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Table 3b 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Objective Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect 
Effects on Intergroup Outcomes 
Paths  
 
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative 
Contact 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T1 
Low 0.062 0.101
a 
-0.053** 0.018 
Medium  0.025 0.065 -0.064*** 0.023* 
  High -0.011 0.029 -0.074*** 0.036* 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Prejudice T2 
Low 0.010 0.058 -0.054*** 0.011* 
Medium  0.023 0.042 -0.051*** 0.028** 
  High 0.036 0.026 -0.047* 0.052** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 0.002 
Medium  0.019 0.020 -0.002 0.002 
  High 0.048 0.049 -0.001 0.000 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table 4a  
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Perceived Diversity’s Conditional Total Effects on the 
Mediators, and the Mediators’ Conditional Total Effects on Prejudice 
Paths  
 
 
IV  MEDIATOR    OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Cross-sectional   
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.354*** Positive 
Contact 
T1 
 
   
M: 0.298*** -0.275*** -0.284*** -0.292*** Prejudice T1 
H: 0.243*** 
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.196** Negative 
Contact 
T1 
 
   
M: 0.223*** 0.075 0.095* 0.115* Prejudice T1 
H: 0.251*** 
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.247*** Positive 
Contact 
T2 
 
   
M: 0.236*** -0.253*** -0.221*** -0.188*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.226*** 
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.097 Negative 
Contact 
T2 
 
   
M: 0.144** 0.098
a 
0.143*** 0.188*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.191** 
 
   
Longitudinal   
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.027 Positive 
Contact 
T2/T1 
 
   
M: 0.030 -0.048 -0.028 -0.007 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.033 
 
   
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.090 Negative 
Contact 
T2/T1 
 
   
M: 0.047 0.032 0.017 0.003 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.004 
 
   
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; L = Low; M = Medium; H = High 
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Table 4b 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Perceived Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect 
Effects on Intergroup Outcomes 
Paths  
 
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative 
Contact 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T1 
Low -0.033 0.035 -0.087*** 0.016 
Medium  0.019 0.077
a 
-0.082*** 0.021* 
  High 0.071 0.118* -0.074*** 0.028* 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.155** -0.115
a 
-0.051** 0.011 
Medium  -0.042 -0.013 -0.051** 0.020* 
  High 0.071 0.090
a 
-0.051** 0.031* 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.060 -0.062 -0.001 0.003 
Medium  -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 0.001 
  High 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.000 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Online Appendices 
Appendix A 
Income distributions per sample 
In Study 1, annual gross household income showed a fairly normal distribution, with 
9% earning less than €12,500, 13% between €12,500 and €26,000, 25% between €26,000 and 
€39,000, 22% between €39,000 and €65,000, and 9% earned more than €56,000. Twenty-two 
percent of the respondents chose the option “I do not want to disclose this information”. 
In Study 2, monthly net household income was fairly normally distributed, with 1% 
earning less than €500, 6% between €500 and €1000, 12% between €1000 and €1500, 20% 
between €1500 and €2000, 12% between €2000 and €2500, 14% between €2500 and €3000, 
9% between €3000 and €3500, 6% between €3500 and €4000, 7% between €4000 and €4500, 
3% between €4500 and €5000, and 5% earned more than €5000. Five percent of the 
respondents chose not to divulge this information. Sixty percent of the sample was married, 
19% was single, 12% was divorced, and 9% was widowed. Finally, 36% was evangelist, 36% 
did not have any religious denomination, 26% was catholic, 1% was Muslim, and 1% 
categorized themselves as belonging to an ‘other religion’. 
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Appendix B 
Changes in Model Fit (i.e., ΔDeviance provided by χ²(df = 1) change in -2 * log-likelihood) and ICCs in Multilevel Model per Outcome 
 
Study 1 
Positive  
Contact 
Negative 
Contact 
Threat Generalized 
Trust 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Subtle 
Prejudice 
Blatant 
Prejudice 
Δχ²(1) 0.43 8.07** 8.94** 0.00 0.02 0.00 4.71* 0.89 
ICC 0.77 4.78 3.89
 
0.00 0.21 0.00 3.02 1.50 
 
Study 2 
Positive  
Contact T1 
Negative 
Contact T1 
Prejudice T1 Positive  
Contact T2 
Negative 
Contact T2 
Prejudice T2   
Δχ²(1) 2.93
a 
0.11 0.24 5.07* 0.42 0.64   
ICC 10.61 1.27 2.77 13.91 2.55 4.13   
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001  
ICC = intraclass correlation (i.e., the percentage of variance at level 2 of the multilevel model) 
52 
  
Appendix C 
Table A 
Correlations among Study Variables in Study 1 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Objective Diversity -          
2. Estimations of Diversity .41*** -         
3. RWA -.05 .13*** -        
4. Positive Contact .13*** -.03 -.21*** -       
5. Negative Contact .13*** .27*** .14*** -.10** -      
6. Outgroup Threat -.02 .25*** .45*** -.39*** .40*** -     
7. General Trust -.01 -.20*** -.12** .22*** -.31*** -.27*** -    
8. Ingroup Trust .01 -.15*** -.06 .17*** -.15*** -.14*** .78*** -   
9. Outgroup Trust .01 -.19*** -.21*** .33*** -.36*** -.43*** .72*** .66*** -  
10. Subtle Prejudice .00 .16*** .44*** -.44*** .48*** .76*** -.34*** -.15*** -.49*** - 
11. Blatant Prejudice .00 .18*** .27*** -.45*** .34*** .63*** -.24*** -.16*** -.38*** .60*** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table B 
Correlations among Study Variables in Study 2 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Objective Diversity T1 -           
2. Perceived Diversity T1 .43*** -          
3. RWA T1 -.25*** .09a -         
4. Positive Contact T1 .29*** .32***  -.31*** -        
5. Negative Contact T1 .22*** .23*** -.01 .12* -       
6. Subtle Prejudice T1 -.11* -.03 .60*** -.40*** .07 -      
7. Objective Diversity T2 1.00*** .43*** -.25*** .29*** .22*** -.11* -     
8. Perceived Diversity T2 .39*** .75*** -.12* .31*** .18*** -.06 .39*** -    
9. RWA T2 -.24*** -.06 .82*** -.29*** .03 .53*** -.24*** -.09a -   
10. Positive Contact T2 .29*** .24*** -.35*** .66*** .09a -.42*** .29*** .26*** -.33*** -  
11. Negative Contact T2 .20*** .16*** -.03 .11* .55*** .11** .20*** .15*** -.07 .08a  
12. Subtle Prejudice T2 -.11* -.05 .54*** -.34*** .07 .78*** -.11* -.07 .55*** -.37*** .09a 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Appendix D 
MPlus syntax 
Study 1 
TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS OBJECTIVE; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city OD RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust subrac 
blatrac ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW 
RWB ODRWB POSCRWB NEGCRWB THREATRWB; 
WITHIN ARE RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
BETWEEN ARE OD RWB ODRWB POSCRWB NEGCRWB THREATRWB; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
DEFINE: 
RWB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW); 
ODRWB = CLUSTER_MEAN (ODRW); 
POSCRWB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSCRW); 
NEGCRWB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGCRW); 
THREATRWB = CLUSTER_MEAN (THREATRW); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RW ODRW; 
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NEGC ON RW ODRW; 
THREAT ON RW ODRW; 
%BETWEEN% 
gentrust ON OD; 
intrust ON OD; 
outtrust ON OD; 
subrac ON OD; 
blatrac ON OD; 
POSC ON OD (a); 
NEGC ON OD (b); 
THREAT ON OD (c); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ad);  
ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;   
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS OBJECTIVE SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city OD RWL POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL 
RWLB ODRWLB POSCRWLB NEGCRWLB THREATRWLB; 
WITHIN ARE RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
BETWEEN ARE OD RWLB ODRWLB POSCRWLB NEGCRWLB THREATRWLB; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
DEFINE: 
RWLB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RWL); 
ODRWLB = CLUSTER_MEAN (ODRWL); 
POSCRWLB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSCRWL); 
NEGCRWLB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGCRWL); 
THREATRWLB = CLUSTER_MEAN (THREATRWL); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RWL ODRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RWL ODRWL; 
NEGC ON RWL ODRWL; 
THREAT ON RWL ODRWL; 
%BETWEEN% 
gentrust ON OD; 
intrust ON OD; 
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outtrust ON OD; 
subrac ON OD; 
blatrac ON OD; 
POSC ON OD (a); 
NEGC ON OD (b); 
THREAT ON OD (c); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ad);  
ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;  
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS OBJECTIVE SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city OD RWH POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH 
RWHB ODRWHB POSCRWHB NEGCRWHB THREATRWHB; 
WITHIN ARE RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
BETWEEN ARE OD RWHB ODRWHB POSCRWHB NEGCRWHB THREATRWHB; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
DEFINE: 
RWHB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RWH); 
ODRWHB = CLUSTER_MEAN (ODRWH); 
POSCRWHB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSCRWH); 
NEGCRWHB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGCRWH); 
THREATRWHB = CLUSTER_MEAN (THREATRWH); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RWH ODRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RWH ODRWH; 
NEGC ON RWH ODRWH; 
THREAT ON RWH ODRWH; 
%BETWEEN% 
gentrust ON OD; 
intrust ON OD; 
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outtrust ON OD; 
subrac ON OD; 
blatrac ON OD; 
POSC ON OD (a); 
NEGC ON OD (b); 
THREAT ON OD (c); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ad);  
ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;  
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS ESTIMATED; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city ED RWL POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
WITHIN ARE ED RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RWL EDRWL POSCRWL NEGCRWL THREATRWL; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RWL EDRWL; 
NEGC ON RWL EDRWL; 
THREAT ON RWL EDRWL; 
gentrust ON ED; 
intrust ON ED; 
outtrust ON ED; 
subrac ON ED; 
blatrac ON ED; 
POSC ON ED (a); 
NEGC ON ED (b); 
THREAT ON ED (c); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ad);  
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ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;  
  
62 
  
TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS ESTIMATED SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city OD RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust subrac 
blatrac ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
WITHIN ARE RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
BETWEEN ARE OD; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RW ODRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RW ODRW; 
NEGC ON RW ODRW; 
THREAT ON RW ODRW; 
%BETWEEN% 
gentrust ON OD; 
intrust ON OD; 
outtrust ON OD; 
subrac ON OD; 
blatrac ON OD; 
POSC ON OD (a); 
NEGC ON OD (b); 
THREAT ON OD (c); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
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NEW(ad);  
ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;  
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL NETHERLANDS ESTIMATED SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS MPLUSNLshort.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE city OD ED RW POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac ODRW EDRW POSCRW NEGCRW THREATRW RWL RWH ODRWL 
ODRWH EDRWL EDRWH POSCRWL POSCRWH NEGCRWL NEGCRWH 
THREATRWL THREATRWH; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE city ED RWH POSC NEGC THREAT gentrust intrust outtrust 
subrac blatrac EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
WITHIN ARE ED RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
CLUSTER IS city; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000. 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN% 
gentrust ON RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
gentrust ON POSC (d); 
gentrust ON NEGC (e); 
gentrust ON THREAT (f); 
intrust ON RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
intrust ON POSC (g); 
intrust ON NEGC (h); 
intrust ON THREAT (i); 
outtrust ON RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
outtrust ON POSC (j); 
outtrust ON NEGC (k); 
outtrust ON THREAT (l); 
subrac ON RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
subrac ON POSC (m); 
subrac ON NEGC (n); 
subrac ON THREAT (o); 
blatrac ON RWH EDRWH POSCRWH NEGCRWH THREATRWH; 
blatrac ON POSC (p); 
blatrac ON NEGC (q); 
blatrac ON THREAT (r); 
POSC ON RWH EDRWH; 
NEGC ON RWH EDRWH; 
THREAT ON RWH EDRWH; 
gentrust ON ED; 
intrust ON ED; 
outtrust ON ED; 
subrac ON ED; 
blatrac ON ED; 
POSC ON ED (a); 
NEGC ON ED (b); 
THREAT ON ED (c); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ad);  
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ad=a*d; 
NEW(ag); 
ag=a*g; 
NEW(aj); 
aj=a*j; 
NEW(am); 
am=a*m; 
NEW(ap); 
ap=a*p; 
NEW(be); 
be=b*e; 
NEW(bh); 
bh=b*h; 
NEW(bk); 
bk=b*k; 
NEW(bn); 
bn=b*n; 
NEW(bq); 
bq=b*q; 
NEW(cf); 
cf=c*f; 
NEW(ci); 
ci=c*i; 
NEW(cl); 
cl=c*l; 
NEW(co); 
co=c*o; 
NEW(cr); 
cr=c*r; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;   
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Study 2 
TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 
NEGC1RW1 RW1B OD1RW1B POSC1RW1B NEGC1RW1B; 
WITHIN ARE RW1 OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1B OD1RW1B POSC1RW1B NEGC1RW1B; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1); 
OD1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1); 
POSC1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1); 
NEGC1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1 OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1 OD1RW1; 
NEGC1 ON RW1 OD1RW1; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ1 ON OD1; 
POSC1 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
 
  
67 
  
TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1 SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L 
NEGC1RW1L RW1LB OD1RW1LB POSC1RW1LB NEGC1RW1LB; 
WITHIN ARE RW1L OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1LB OD1RW1LB POSC1RW1LB NEGC1RW1LB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1L); 
OD1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1L); 
POSC1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1L); 
NEGC1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1L); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1L OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1L OD1RW1L; 
NEGC1 ON RW1L OD1RW1L; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ1 ON OD1; 
POSC1 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1H 
POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H RW1HB OD1RW1HB POSC1RW1HB NEGC1RW1HB; 
WITHIN ARE RW1H OD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1HB OD1RW1HB POSC1RW1HB NEGC1RW1HB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1H); 
OD1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1H); 
POSC1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1H); 
NEGC1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1H); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1H OD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1H OD1RW1H; 
NEGC1 ON RW1H OD1RW1H; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ1 ON OD1; 
POSC1 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W2; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD2 RW2 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD2RW2 POSC2RW2 
NEGC2RW2 RW2B OD2RW2B POSC2RW2B NEGC2RW2B; 
WITHIN ARE RW2 OD2RW2 POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2; 
BETWEEN ARE OD2 RW2B OD2RW2B POSC2RW2B NEGC2RW2B; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW2B = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW2); 
OD2RW2B = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD2RW2); 
POSC2RW2B = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC2RW2); 
NEGC2RW2B = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC2RW2); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2 OD2RW2 POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2 OD2RW2; 
NEGC2 ON RW2 OD2RW2; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD2; 
POSC2 ON OD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD2 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W2 SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD2 RW2L POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD2RW2L POSC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2L RW2LB OD2RW2LB POSC2RW2LB NEGC2RW2LB; 
WITHIN ARE RW2L OD2RW2L POSC2RW2L NEGC2RW2L; 
BETWEEN ARE OD2 RW2LB OD2RW2LB POSC2RW2LB NEGC2RW2LB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW2LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW2L); 
OD2RW2LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD2RW2L); 
POSC2RW2LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC2RW2L); 
NEGC2RW2LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC2RW2L); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2L OD2RW2L POSC2RW2L NEGC2RW2L; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2L OD2RW2L; 
NEGC2 ON RW2L OD2RW2L; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD2; 
POSC2 ON OD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD2 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W2 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD2 RW2H POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD2RW2H OSC2RW2H 
NEGC2RW2H RW2HB OD2RW2HB POSC2RW2HB NEGC2RW2HB; 
WITHIN ARE RW2H OD2RW2H POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2H; 
BETWEEN ARE OD2 RW2HB OD2RW2HB POSC2RW2HB NEGC2RW2HB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW2HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW2H); 
OD2RW2HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD2RW2H); 
POSC2RW2HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC2RW2H); 
NEGC2RW2HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC2RW2H); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2H OD2RW2H POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2H; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2H OD2RW2H; 
NEGC2 ON RW2H OD2RW2H; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD2; 
POSC2 ON OD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD2 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 
NEGC1RW1; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1 PD1RW1; 
NEGC1 ON RW1 PD1RW1; 
PREJ1 ON PD1; 
POSC1 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1 SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 
NEGC1RW1; 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L 
NEGC1RW1L; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L 
NEGC1RW1L; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1L PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1L PD1RW1L; 
NEGC1 ON RW1L PD1RW1L; 
PREJ1 ON PD1; 
POSC1 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;   
74 
  
TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H 
NEGC1RW1H; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H 
NEGC1RW1H; 
ClUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ1 ON RW1H PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
PREJ1 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ1 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC1 ON RW1H PD1RW1H; 
NEGC1 ON RW1H PD1RW1H; 
PREJ1 ON PD1; 
POSC1 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC1 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W2; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD2 RW2 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2 POSC2RW2 
NEGC2RW2; 
WITHIN ARE PD2 RW2 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2 POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2 PD2RW2 POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2 PD2RW2; 
NEGC2 ON RW2 PD2RW2; 
PREJ2 ON PD2; 
POSC2 ON PD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD2 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W2 SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD2 RW2L POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2L POSC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2L; 
WITHIN ARE PD2 RW2L POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2L POSC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2L; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2L PD2RW2L POSC2RW2L NEGC2RW2L; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2L PD2RW2L; 
NEGC2 ON RW2L PD2RW2L; 
PREJ2 ON PD2; 
POSC2 ON PD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD2 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W2 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD2 RW2H POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2H POSC2RW2H 
NEGC2RW2H; 
WITHIN ARE PD2 RW2H POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 PD2RW2H POSC2RW2H 
NEGC2RW2H; 
ClUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW2H PD2RW2H POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2H; 
PREJ2 ON POSC2 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC2 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW2H PD2RW2H; 
NEGC2 ON RW2H PD2RW2H; 
PREJ2 ON PD2; 
POSC2 ON PD2 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD2 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1-W2; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 RW1B POSC1B NEGC1B PREJ1B OD1RW1B 
POSC1RW1B NEGC1RW1B; 
WITHIN ARE RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1B POSC1B NEGC1B PREJ1B OD1RW1B POSC1RW1B 
NEGC1RW1B; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1); 
POSC1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1); 
NEGC1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1); 
PREJ1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (PREJ1); 
OD1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1); 
POSC1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1); 
NEGC1RW1B = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1 OD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1 OD1RW1; 
NEGC2 ON RW1 OD1RW1; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD1; 
POSC2 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;  
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1-W2SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L RW1LB POSC1LB NEGC1LB PREJ1LB 
OD1RW1LB POSC1RW1LB NEGC1RW1LB; 
WITHIN ARE RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1LB POSC1LB NEGC1LB PREJ1LB OD1RW1LB 
POSC1RW1LB NEGC1RW1LB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1L); 
POSC1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1L); 
NEGC1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1L); 
PREJ1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (PREJ1L); 
OD1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1L); 
POSC1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1L); 
NEGC1RW1LB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1L); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1L OD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1L OD1RW1L; 
NEGC2 ON RW1L OD1RW1L; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD1; 
POSC2 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL;   
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY OBJECTIVE W1-W2 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis OD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
OD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H RW1HB POSC1HB NEGC1HB PREJ1HB 
OD1RW1HB POSC1RW1HB NEGC1RW1HB; 
WITHIN ARE RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
BETWEEN ARE OD1 RW1HB POSC1HB NEGC1HB PREJ1HB OD1RW1HB 
POSC1RW1HB NEGC1RW1HB; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
DEFINE: 
RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (RW1H); 
POSC1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1H); 
NEGC1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1H); 
PREJ1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (PREJ1H); 
OD1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (OD1RW1H); 
POSC1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (POSC1RW1H); 
NEGC1RW1HB = CLUSTER_MEAN (NEGC1RW1H); 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1H OD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1H OD1RW1H; 
NEGC2 ON RW1H OD1RW1H; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
%BETWEEN% 
PREJ2 ON OD1; 
POSC2 ON OD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON OD1 (b); 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1-W2; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1 PD1RW1; 
NEGC2 ON RW1 PD1RW1; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
PREJ2 ON PD1; 
POSC2 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1-W2 SLOPE LOW RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1L POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L 
NEGC1RW1L; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1L PD1RW1L POSC1RW1L NEGC1RW1L; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1L PD1RW1L; 
NEGC2 ON RW1L PD1RW1L; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
PREJ2 ON PD1; 
POSC2 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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TITLE: MPLUS FULL MODEL GERMANY PERCEIVED W1-W2 SLOPE HIGH RWA; 
DATA: FILE IS GFE_longitud_short.dat; 
VARIABLE: NAMES ARE kreis OD1 PD1 RW1 POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 OD2 PD2 RW2 
POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 OD1RW1 PD1RW1 POSC1RW1 NEGC1RW1 OD2RW2 D2RW2 
POSC2RW2 NEGC2RW2 RW1L RW1H RW2L RW2H OD1RW1L OD1RW1H PD1RW1L 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1L POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1L NEGC1RW1H OD2RW2L 
OD2RW2H PD2RW2L PD2RW2H POSC2RW2L POSC2RW2H NEGC2RW2L 
NEGC2RW2H; 
MISSING ARE ALL(-9999); 
USEVARIABLES ARE kreis PD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 POSC2 NEGC2 PREJ2 
PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
WITHIN ARE PD1 RW1H POSC1 NEGC1 PREJ1 PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H 
NEGC1RW1H; 
CLUSTER IS kreis; 
ANALYSIS: TYPE IS TWOLEVEL RANDOM; 
ALGORITHM=INTEGRATION; 
MITERATIONS=50000; 
MODEL:  
%WITHIN%  
PREJ2 ON RW1H PD1RW1H POSC1RW1H NEGC1RW1H; 
PREJ2 ON POSC1 (c); 
PREJ2 ON NEGC1 (d); 
POSC2 ON RW1H PD1RW1H; 
NEGC2 ON RW1H PD1RW1H; 
PREJ1 WITH PREJ2; 
POSC1 WITH POSC2; 
NEGC1 WITH NEGC2; 
PREJ2 ON PD1; 
POSC2 ON PD1 (a); 
NEGC2 ON PD1 (b); 
%BETWEEN% 
MODEL CONSTRAINT:  
NEW(ac); 
ac=a*c; 
NEW(bd); 
bd=b*d; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 SAMPSTAT STANDARDIZED CINTERVAL; 
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Appendix E 
Table A 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering Objective Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and 
Indirect Effects on Intergroup Contact and Threat 
Paths  
 
    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Generalized  
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Ingroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Outgroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Subtle 
Prejudice 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Blatant 
Prejudice 
Objective  
Diversity 
Positive  
Contact 
Low 0.091
a 
0.072 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.012 0.003 
Medium  0.124** 0.131*** 0.000 0.000
 
0.000 -0.004 -0.005 
  High 0.157** 0.189*** 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.012 
Objective  
Diversity 
Negative  
Contact 
Low 0.081 0.089* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.014 0.000 
Medium  0.135*** 0.115*** 0.003 0.001
 
0.000 0.007 0.001 
  High 0.189*** 0.142*** 0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.037 0.004 
Objective  
Diversity 
Threat 
Low -0.045 -0.013 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.021 -0.004 
Medium  0.005 -0.009 0.000 0.001
 
0.000 0.009 0.005 
  High 0.055 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.044 0.008 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table B 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Structural Model in Study 1 considering Estimations of Diversity’s Conditional Total, Direct, and 
Indirect Effects on Intergroup Contact and Threat 
Paths  
 
    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Generalized  
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Ingroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Outgroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Subtle 
Prejudice 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Blatant 
Prejudice 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Positive  
Contact 
Low 0.017 0.103* -0.003 0.010 -0.027 -0.023 -0.036 
Medium  -0.004 0.085* 0.001 -0.002
 
-0.022 -0.022 -0.043 
  High -0.024 0.067 0.034 -0.044 -0.003 -0.020 -0.051 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Negative  
Contact 
Low 0.231*** 0.171*** 0.021 -0.006 0.031 0.028 0.000 
Medium  0.257*** 0.179*** 0.029** -0.016*
 
0.018 0.040*** 0.006 
  High 0.283*** 0.186*** 0.038** -0.025** 0.007 0.054*** 0.013 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Threat 
Low 0.190*** 0.094** -0.004 -0.005 0.028* 0.041 0.043*** 
Medium  0.192*** 0.096** -0.003 -0.007
 
0.016* 0.052*** 0.039*** 
  High 0.194*** 0.099** -0.002 -0.008 0.007 0.064*** 0.032** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table C 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Objective Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect 
Effects on Intergroup Contact 
Paths  
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Prejudice 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T1 
Low 0.210*** 0.221*** -0.025 
Medium  0.229*** 0.243*** -0.009 
  High 0.248*** 0.265*** 0.004 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.206*** 0.198** -0.004 
Medium  0.221*** 0.224*** -0.007 
  High 0.237*** 0.250*** -0.008 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.063 0.061 0.001 
Medium  0.083* 0.086* -0.003 
  High 0.103* 0.109* -0.006 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T1 
Low 0.198** 0.188** 0.007 
Medium  0.239*** 0.234*** 0.003 
  High 0.279*** 0.280*** -0.001 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.117
a 
0.115
a
 0.002 
Medium  0.205*** 0.203*** 0.004 
  High 0.293*** 0.291*** 0.007 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.057 0.058 -0.001 
Medium  0.089* 0.087
a
 0.002 
  High 0.121* 0.115* 0.006 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table D 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models in Study 2 considering Perceived Diversity’ Conditional Total, Direct, and Indirect 
Effects on Intergroup Contact 
Paths  
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Prejudice 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T1 
Low 0.354*** 0.332***
 
0.012 
Medium  0.298*** 0.300*** -0.007 
  High 0.243*** 0.267*** -0.024 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.247*** 0.189** 0.052* 
Medium  0.236*** 0.215*** 0.012 
  High 0.226*** 0.241*** -0.015 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.027 0.019
 
0.008 
Medium  0.030 0.028 0.002 
  High 0.033 0.038 -0.005 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T1 
Low 0.196** 0.206** -0.004 
Medium  0.223*** 0.225*** 0.002 
  High 0.251*** 0.244*** 0.007 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.097 0.129
a 
-0.031
a 
Medium  0.144** 0.154** -0.008 
  High 0.191** 0.180** 0.013 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.090 0.096
a 
-0.007 
Medium  0.047 0.048 -0.001 
  High 0.004 0.000 0.004 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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Table E 
Path Analysis: Standardized Estimates of the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Structural 
Models considering Objective Diversity’ Conditional Effects on Estimations of Diversity 
(Study 1) and Perceived Diversity (Study 2) 
Paths    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Objective  
Diversity 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Low 0.381*** 
Medium  0.423*** 
  High 0.464*** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Perceived  
Diversity T1 
Low 0.366*** 
Medium  0.444*** 
  High 0.522*** 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Perceived  
Diversity T2 
Low 0.245*** 
Medium  0.400*** 
  High 0.556*** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Perceived  
Diversity T2 
Low 0.005 
Medium  0.079* 
  High 0.153** 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
 
